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THE LAW AND EQUITY REFORM BILL AND
FEDERAL EQUITY RULES; THEIR EFFECT
IN FEDERAL PROCEDURE.
Sections 274a and 274b of the Law and Equity Bill, passed by
Congress March 3, 1915, were drawn by a committee of the
American Bar Association. Section 274c (not discussed in this
paper) relating to jurisdictional amendments in removal cases,
was proposed in 1912 by judge Clayton, then in Congress, now
United States District Judge for the Northern and Middle Dis-
tricts of ilabama. The pertinent constitutional provisions, and
the rules and statutes, are here set out in full. Equity Rules 22
and 23 partially cover the same ground.
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority."
Constitution, sec. 2, art. 3.
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined
in any court of the United States than according to the rules of
the common law." Seventh amendment to the Constitution,
adopted A. D. i79i.
"Suits in equity shall not be maintained in any court of the
United States in any case where a plain, adequate and complete
remedy may be had at law." Sec. 267, judicial Code, reenacting
Section 723, R. S., originally passed Sept. 24, 1789.
"Sec. 274a. That in case any of said courts shall find that
a suit at law should have been brought in equity or a suit in
equity should have been brought at law, the court shall order
any amendments to the pleadings which may be necessary to
conform them to the proper practice. Any party to the suit
shall have the right, at any stage of the cause, "to amend his
pleadings so as to obviate the objection that his suit was not
brought on the right side of the court. The cause shall proceed
and be determined upon such amended pleadings. All testimony
taken before such amendment, if preserved, shall stand as testi-
mony in the cause with like effect as if the pleadings had been
originally in the amended form."
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"Sec. 274b. That in all actions at law equitable defenses may
be interposed by answer, plea, or replication without the necessity
of filing a bill on the equity side of the court. The defendant
shall have the same rights in such case as if he had filed a bill
embodying the defense of seeking the relief prayed for in such
answer or plea. Equitable relief respecting the subject matter of
the suit may thus be obtained by answer or plea. In case affirm-
ative relief is prayed in such answer or plea, the plaintiff shall
file a replication. Review of the judgment or decree entered in
such case shall be regulated by rule of court. Whether such
review be sought by writ of error dr by appeal the appellate
court shall have full power to render such judgment upon the
records as law and justice shall require." Act of March 3, 1915,
U. S. Compiled Statutes, secs. 125ia, 125ib, 38 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 956.
"If at any time it shall appear that a suit commenced in equity
should have been brought as an action on the law side of the
court, it shall be forthwith transferred to the law side and be
there proceeded with, with only such alteration in the pleadings
as shall be essential." Equity Rule 22, promulgated Nov. 4,
1912.
"If in a suit in equity a matter ordinarily determinable at law
arises, such matter shall be determinable in that suit according
to the principles applicable, without sending the case or question
to the law side of the court." Equity Rule 23, Nov. 4, 1912.
The seventh amendment and the act of 1789 (sec. 267) may
be regarded as contemporaneous provisions, since the amendment
was submitted to the states about the same time as the adoption
of the statute. The latter has been regarded by the courts as
having for its main object the preservation of the right of trial
by jury in common law cases., The seventh amendment is in
force in all the organized territories.2
The general purpose and spirit of these provisions is plain'.
Plaintiff is not to be turned out of court because he has miscon-
ceived the nature or form of his action; that arbitrary and unjust
rule has been swept away. It is true that plaintiff might get
some benefit from the doctrine of waiver, under certain condi-
tions, but that doctrine was never carried to its logical extent,
' Green v. Turner, 98 Fed. 756.
2Kennon V. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 28, 9 Sup. Ct. 696, 33 L. ed. iiO;
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 18 Sup. Ct. 62o, 42 L. ed. io61; Dill v.
Ebey, infra.
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and afforded only partial relief, as will be seen further on.
Whether full relief will result from the new statute depends
entirely on the liberality or strictness to be applied by the courts.
Two important questions arise under the new practice, (i)
Whether the cause of action may be changed by amendment
after the statute of limitations has run, from equity to law, or
vie versa; (2) How far the present rules as to waiver have
been modified. The situation may be illustrated by cases taken
from the former practice: An insurance company held a mort-
gage against one Schurmeir. The latter died, and administration
was taken out. The probate court allowed six months to file
claims, and the state statute permitted the time to be extended,
by application showing equitable reasons within twelve months
thereafter. After the six months had expired, but within the
additional twelve months, the company obtained a deficiency
judgment on its mortgage claim. It might then have applied
either in the probate court or the federal circuit court (the latter
having jurisdiction by diverse citizenship) on the equity side, for
an extension of time and leave to file. Instead of taking this
course it commenced an action at law in the federal court, after
such suit was barred by the six months limit. After its com-
plaint had been twice dismissed by the circuit court of appeals
application was made to transfer the case to the equity side, to
amend, and apply for an extension of time to file. The right to
do this was finally sustained, one of the three judges dissenting
on the ground that the amendment changed the cause of action
after the statute had run.' As the Supreme Court had held in
Union Pacific Railway v. Wyler' that amendments changing the
cause of action are not allowable after limitation run, the
Schurmeir case stands on narrow ground. But section 274a
provides that "any party to the suit shall have the right, at any
stage of the cause, to amend his pleadings so as to obviate the
objection that his suit was not brought on the right side of the
court." This is broad and explicit, and the statute liberally
remedial.
Schurmeier v. Connecticut Mutual, 124 Fed. 865, 6o C. C. A. 51; 37
Fed. 42, 69 C. C. A. 22; 171 Fed. 1, 96 C. C. A. io7. The discussion by
Judge Hook, who wrote the majority opinion, and Judge Sanborn, dis-
senting, is clear and full.
a i58 U. S. 285, IS Sup. Ct. 877, 39 L. ed. 983. This decision is consider-
ably limited in Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct.
r35, 57 L. ed. 355.
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In respect to the effect of the Law and Equity Bill on the
doctrine of waiver of the right to the legal remedy by defending
in equity, or vice versa, an extreme situation may be referred
to, one often met in the federal decisions, that of equitable
ejectment.6  A bill to quiet title is filed by one out of possession
against one in possession, these facts appearing on the face of
the bill. Ejectment is the proper remedy; equity has no juris-
diction, and defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial.
Issue is joined without objection. The proof consists entirely
of written instruments, no question of fact for a jury being pre-
sented, and there is a decree for plaintiff. On appeal defendant
for the first time raises the question of adequate remedy at law.
Under the practice prevailing before the new rules and statute
the appellate court would have ordered a dismissal" because
equity had no jurisdiction. If ejectment had been brought the
parties might have waived a jury trial, and in any event there
was nothing for a jury to try. The same judge would have tried
the case, and in substantially the same way; but because plain-
tiff had misconceived his remedy dismissal was the only alterna-
tive. No matter of substance was involved, but plaintiff must
go out of court on a pure technicality. Meanwhile the statute of
limitations might have run, so that plaintiff was deprived of all
remedy whatsoever. If the Law and Equity Bill shall be con-
strued to require an amendment in such case (instead of a dis-
missal), and to change the practice to that extent only, not much
will have been gained. But it seems that the courts will be
inclined to extend this remedial legislation to matters of sub-
stance, and give it the full beneficial effect to which it seems to
be entitled.6a
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL AT LAW.
A proper consideration of the question whether the ddctrine
of waiver is affected by the remedial legislation in question
makes it necessary to determine just how far the federal courts
have heretofore applied that doctrine to equity cases in which
there was, or was claimed to be, an adequate remedy at law,
and to cases at law when the proper remedy was an equitable
6Lewis v. Cocks and Hicks v. Babin, infra.
" Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, 9 Sup. Ct. 486, 32 L. ed. 934; Singer
S. M. Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 33 Sup. Ct. 942, 57 L. ed. 1288.
'a United States v. Illinois Surety Co. and Dill v. Ebey, both fully stated
on a later page. Schurmeier v. Connecticut Mutual, supra.
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one. There are a very large number of decisions on the subject,
only the more important ones being here referred to.
The general and rather indefinite rule on the subject has been
that there is no waiver in cases lying outside the equity jurisdic-
tion, but in those belonging to the class over which equity has
jurisdiction the objection that the remedy at law is adequate is
waived unless taken at an early stage, by motion, suggestion, plea
or answer, or unless the court takes notice of the defect, by action
sua sponte.
Actions to recover the possession of land in the occupation of
the defendant are essentially legal in character, having no equit,
able feature whatever, and there can therefore be no waiver by
failing to raise the question. The court may at any time, upon
its own motion, take notice of the objection and dismiss the suit.7
If the court as an equitable tribunal is not competent to grant the
relief sought, and as such is without jurisdiction of the subject
matter, there can be no waiver.8
A like rule has been applied to cases where plaintiff's demand
is for money damages, either contract or tort, apart from some
recognized ground of equity jurisdiction, such as trust or
accounting.9
'A leading case is Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, 23 L. ed. 70, one of
equitable ejectment, in which it was also alleged that defendant had prac-
ticed a gross fraud upon plaintiff, which was not proven. Another like
case often approved is Hipp v. Babin, ig How. 271, 15 L. ed. 633, where
plaintiff sued in equity to recover the possession of land, with an account
of the rents and profits. The court held that it was the universal practice
to dismiss bills grounded on a merely legal title, where there was no
allegation as to partition, equitable accounting, discovery, or multiplicity
of suits.
8 Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530, 1o Sup. Ct. 604, 33 L.
ed. o2i, a case of a creditors' suit brought without first having exhausted
the remedy at law. A waiver was held to exist.
'Brown v. Fletcher, 2o6 Fed. 46!, 124 C. C. A. 367, 2d Circuit, a suit
to recover a fund from a testamentary trustee. A leading case is Scott v.
Neely, i4o U. S. iO6, ii Sup. Ct. 712, 35 L. ed. 358, where it is said:
"All actions which seek to recover specific property, real or per-
sonal, with or without damages for its detention, or a money judg-
ment for breach of a simple contract, or as damages for injury to
person or property, are legal actions, and can be brought in the
federal courts only on their law side. Demands of this kind do not
lose their character as claims cognizable in the courts of the United
States only on their law side, because in some state courts, by
virtue of state legislation, equitable relief in aid of the demand at
law may be sought in the same action. Such blending of remedies
is not permissible in the courts of the United States."
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Suits for patent infringement may be brought in equity while
the patent is still in force, for an injunction and account of
profits, and at law either before or after the patent has expired,
for damages. If the patent is about expiring an equity suit may
be begun if there be time to obtain a temporary injunction
according to the rules and practice of the court; otherwise the
suit should be at law. As to suits brought before expiration
the objection of an adequate remedy at law is waived if not raised
at the outset.10 If the recovery of damages and profits is the
real object of the suit, the prayer for injunction being merely a
subterfuge, the case will be transferred to the law docket under
Rule 23.11
In other cases also, injunction suits may be brought where
equity gives no remedy, as in the case of unconstitutional taxa-
tion, unless irreparable injury or other distinct ground of
equitable jurisdiction appears. Therefore there is no waiver, and
the objection may be made for the first time in the- appellate
court.'2
In contrast with the decisions referred to there is another
class in which the subject matter is of a kind over which equity
has general jurisdiction, but where plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law. Such cases generally fall within the concurrent
jurisdiction, where the right or estate of plaintiff, and the
remedy, are both legal, but such remedy is not a full, adequate
and complete one.' 3 In this class the rule has been that while
"Clark v. Wooster, iig U. S. 322, 7 Sup. Ct. 217, 30 L. ed. 392. An
equity suit for damages and profit brought after the patent expires, but
where no objection is raised until the case is reached on appeal, is a good
test of the question whether there must be a reversal under the new rules
and law of 1915. The question does not often come up, because the
objection is generally raised at the outset. The leading case on the juris-
diction is Root v. Lake Shore & Mich. Cent. Ry. Co., 105 U. S. 189,
26 L. ed. 975. The Allen case, cited below, was a reversal under similar
circumstances.
' Goldschmidt Thermit Co. V. Primos Chemical Co., 216 Fed. 382. This
suit was before the District Court again (225 Fed. 769) and the rule of
practice in patent cases, as modified by the Equity Rules, fully discussed
by judge Dickinson.
" 'As the entire record failed to show complainant entitled to any
injunction the decree was reversed on appeal. Allen v. Pullman's Pal.
Car Co., 139 U. S. 658, I Sup. Ct. 682, 35 L. ed. 303; Singer Sewing
M. Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 33 Sup. Ct. 942, 57 L. ed. 1288.
"A good illustration is contribution among co-sureties, whlere one has
paid more than his share. Having paid out money at the instance of his
co-sureties, his right to reimbursement is legal, as well as his right to sue
each of them in assumpsit. But such remedy is not so prompt and
efficient as an equitable suit for contribution.
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the court for its own protection might prevent matters properly
cognizable at law from being drawn into chancery at the pleasure
of the parties interested, yet where the subject matter belonged
to a class over which a court of equity had jurisdiction, and the
objection was not made until the hearing on appeal,14 or until
the hearing in the trial court,' the court would apply the rule
of waiver.
This rule obviously has no application to suits which cannot
be maintained under any circumstances, such as ejectment on
an equitable title, judicial enforcement of a ministerial or legis-
lative function, such as levying or collecting taxes, or making
rates for transportation, or for furnishing light or power. In
such cases either a bill in equity or complaint or declaration at
law is bad on its face,16 and may be dismissed at any stage.
Equity Rule 23 has no application to. a bill in equity stating no
cause of action in equity.'
7
1 4Reynes v. Dumont, 13o U. S. 354, 395, 9 Sup. Ct. 486, 32 L. ed. 934;
Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 97, 12 Sup. Ct. 304, 36 L. ed. 82; Southern
Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 2oo U. S. 341, 26 Sup. Ct. 296, 5o L. ed. 507.
In the earlier cases the waiver rule was generally applied only in
appellate courts. In 1889 Judge Blatchford dismissed a suit on the hearing
where the bill disclosed no right to sue in equity. Mills v. Knapp. 39
Fed. 592. In Dederick v. Fox (C. C.), 56 Fed. 714, a similar rule was
decided. There seems to be no good reason why a trial court should hot
apply the rule, when the objection is not made until final hearing. Waite
v. O'Neil, 72 Fed. 348.
' A leading case of equitable ejectment is Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S.
550, 5 Sup. Ct. 631, 28 L. ed. 993, where it was decided that a bill to
recover possession of land, based on an equitable title under a state land
warrant was insufficient. Plaintiff must get in the legal title and then
sue at law. Among the taxing cases are Rees v. City of Watertown, 19
Wall. 107, 22 L. ed. 72; Thompson v. Allen' County, 115 U. S. 55o, 6 Sup.
Ct. 14o, 29 L. ed. 472; Street Grading District v. Hagadorn, 186 Fed. 451,
io8 C. C. A. 429, 8th Circuit, and Preston v. Sturgis Milling Co., 183 Fed.
i, lo5 C. C. A. 293. The following decisions illustrate the distinction
between judicial and legislative power: Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Denver & IV. 0. R. Co., 11o U. S. 682, 4 Sup. Ct. 192, 28 L. ed. 297;
Express Cases, 117 U. S. I, 6 Sup. Ct. 628, 29 L. ed. 791; Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226, 29 Sup. Ct. 68, 53 L. ed. 15o;
Cumberland T. & T. Co. v. United Electric R. Co., 42 Fed. 273, 12 L. R. A.
544; Peoria Water Works Co. v. Peoria Ry. Co., 181 Fed. 99o, ioo4. Of a
similar nature in this respect are suits to set aside a will or its probate,
unless authorized by local law. Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 22 L. ed.
5o9; Beyer v. LeFevre, 186 U. S. 114, 22 Sup. Ct. 765, 46 L. ed. io8o.
"
T So held in a suit to establish a mechanic's lien in which the complaint
or bill was insufficient on the merits. Lindon Itiv. Co. v. Houstain Bros.
Co., 221 Fed. 178, - C. C. A. -.
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It has also been decided that a suit brought on the law side
which should properly have been on the equity side may be
rightfully dismissed, or remanded for amendment under the Law
and Equity Bill' or under the preexisting law, as in the
Schurmeier case.
Before the change made by the rules and the Law and Equity
Bill equitable defenses were sometimes sought to be enforced in
actions at law, as where plaintiff in a personal injury suit
attempted to show that a release of damages made by him was
invalid for unfairness, fraud, or want of his capacity. The same
rule of waiver was applied as in the cases before discussed.1 9
Equitable defenses affecting the right of possession may be shown
in ejectment becatise it is a possessory action.20
8 Smith v. American Nat. Bank, 89 Fed. 8,32, 32 C. C. A. 368, 8th Cir-
cuit; Illinois Surety Co. v. United States, - Fed. -, - C. C. A.
-, 7th Circuit. The latter was a suit at law brought on a bankruptcy
depositary bond given under section 61 of the Bankrupt Act. Section 5oh
of the act provides for suit on such bonds in the name of the United States
for the use of any interested person. It was decided that such remedy is
necessarily an equitable one in case of a failure of the bank, in which all
beneficiaries can be brought in and bound by a single decree. If each
trustee, receiver, or depositor could bring an action at law for his own
benefit, "the possible diversity of opinion as to what that share is might
result either in subjecting the defendant to judgments in excess of the
penalty or in defeating the just claims of the later litigants." A judg-
ment at law for the full penalty and interest was xeversed, and remanded
with leave to amend and proceed under sec. 274a.
The same court, in a suit at law brought on a bond given under the
federal public improvement statute, held that the issues could be deter-
mined as well in a court of law as in equity, where the trial was by jury,
but the jury had been discharged by the court because both parties had
moved for a directed verdict, thereby asserting that there was no dis-
puted question of fact. The trial judge made a full finding of facts,
which were undisputed. It was of no practical importance whether a
court of law or equity was the proper form, as there was little or
nothing for a jury to pass upon. A court of law not being entirely with-
out jurisdiction, the ordinary rule of waiver was also applied. United
States v. Illinois Surety Co., - Fed. , C. C. A. - , 7th
Circuit.
19 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Harris, 63 Fed. 8oo, 12 C. C. A. 598; Union Pac.
R. Co. v. Whitney, 198 Fed. 784 , 117 C. C. A. 392, 8th Circuit. These were
cases of such fraud or incapacity as rendered the release not merely void-
able but void. They were not cases of consent procured by fraud. In
Standard Portland Cement Corp. v. Evans, 2o5 Fed. I, 125 C. C. A. i, it
was decided that the equitable defense of fraud in procuring the corporate
assent to a contract could not be set up in an action at law on the contract,
and that jurisdiction of such a defense could not be conferred by consent
or waiver. See Columbia Digger Co. v. Rector, 215 Fed. 61&
" Dickerson v. Colg ove, IOO U. S. 578, 25 L. ed. 618.
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Though many other cases might be cited on waiver it is thought
the foregoing accurately presents the scope of the rule as
heretofore applied in the national courts.
So far as the remedial rules under consideration have come
before the courts they have been liberally construed, as has been
seen. It would seem that the doctrine of waiver should be con-
siderably extended, and made to apply to every case where the
parties have, by not claiming it, waived the constitutional right
to a jury trial, especially when there are no disputed facts, a in
United States v. Illinois Surety Co., above stated. The following
decision of the Supreme C6urt is fully stated, and is par-
ticularly referred to because of its discussion of the effect of the
adoption by Congress of the state code system of procedure, and
what constitutes waiver of a jury trial:
In the case of Dill v. Ebey,2' a judgment of the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma was under review. The suit was originally brought
on the equity side of the United States Court for the Western
District of Indian Territory to recover" an unpaid stock sub-
scription. Defendant raised the question of adequate remedy at
law by demurrer, and that he was by the Constitution entitled
to a jury trial. The demurrer was overruled in the federal court,
and defendant properly saved an exception. Before any further
proceeding in the case the state of Oklahoma was organized from
the Indian and Oklahoma territories, and the case was thereupon
transferred to the state district court for the proper county.
Defendant then filed an answer to the merits, alleging that he
had paid his subscription. Judgment having been rendered
against him, he moved for a new trial on the ground that he was
entitled to a jury trial, which he asserted had not been waived.
This motion being denied, defendant appealed to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, renewing there his objections as to adequate
remedy at law and the right to a jury trial. The contentions
were overruled, and the judgment affirmed, and then taken to
the United States Supreme Court for review.
The same questions were presented in the Supreme Court, it
being assumed that the Enabling Act and Oklahoma constitution
preserved to defendant all rights asserted in the case while it
was in the territorial court. As to the question of adequate
remedy at law it was decided that the statute of Arkansas
governed that practice, and not section 723 of the federal statutes,
= 229 U. S. i99, 33 Sup. Ct. 620, 57 L. ed. 1148.
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for the reason that the act of Congress by which the territorial
federal court was created provided that its practice, pleadings
and forms of proceeding should conform to those in like causes
in Arkansas. That state had adopted the Code of Procedure.
A later act of Congress specially provided that the chapter of
the Arkansas code relating to pleadings and practice should be
in force in the Indian Territory. This chapter contains the usual
code provisions abolishing forms of action, providing for a
single form of action, which should be either legal or equitable,
and that "An error of the plaintiff as to the kind of proceedings
adopted shall not cause the abatement or dismissal of the action,
but merely a change into the proper proceedings by an amend-
ment in the pleadings, and a transfer of the action to the proper
docket." (It will be seen that this is substantially the same
provision as that of the Equity Rules and statute of 1915.) By
another part of the chapter so adopted a defendant might demur
for want of jurisdiction of person or subject matter, and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action. The Supreme Court
say: "We hold that if the demurrer may be deemed an assertion
by the defendant of a right under § 723, Rev. Stat., to have the
case determined in equity (sic), yet that section was so plainly
inapplicable to the practice in the territorial court that no sub-
stantial federal question is raised, such as would warrant a
review here under § 709, Rev. Stat."
It was also held that the right to a jury trial, if it ever existed,
was waived by the demurrer in the state court, which was an
admission of the facts pleaded. "Indeed," say the court, "since
a demurrer has the necessary effect of admitting the facts alleged
in the complaint, a demand for a trial by jury is quite incon-
gruous, for a jury has no function to perform when the facts
are admitted." Finally it was decided that no federal question
was properly raised; and the writ of error was dismissed.
Rule 23, providing that a matter ordinarily determinable at
law arising in an equity suit shall be determined therein without
sending the matter to the law side, does not authorize the joinder
of legal and equitable causes of action in the same bill, especially
in view of Rule 26, authorizing the joinder of equitable causes
only.2
2
'Bucyrus Co. v. McArthur, 219 Fed. 266, deciding also that Rule 23
obviously relates "only to auxiliary matters of legal cognizance which may
arise in the determination of an equity cause."
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ENGLISH PRACTICE INAPPLICABLE.
The English rules or orders of the Supreme Court of Judica-
ture, adopted under the Judicature Act of 1873, relating to
"Transfers and Consolidation," are analogous to Equity Rules
22 and 23, and the Law and Equity Bill, but actions of all kinds
have been in England so thoroughly fused that judicial construc-
tion by its courts has very little application in the federal courts,
where actions at law, in equity and admiralty, are still so fully
kept separate, as they must be under the Constitution. His
Majesty's High Court of Justice is now vested with all the juris-
diction formerly exercised by the High Courts of Chancery and
Admiralty, the common law courts of King's Bench, Common
Pleas and Exchequer, the Divorce Court, and various other
courts and commissions. The High Court is required to enforce
legal and equitable rights and estates, equitable and legal coun-
terclaims and defenses, not only against or in favor of the par-
ties, but also against third persons who are served with notice
of the suit, whether residents of the United Kingdom or not.
It is provided that the object of the statutes is that, "As far as
possible, all matters so in controversy between the said parties
respectively may be completely and finally determined, and all
multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters
avoided." When there is any conflict or variance between the
rules of equity and the rules of the common law with respect
to the same matter, the rules of equity are to prevail, and there
is a similar provision making the rules of admiralty paramount.
By order 36 (Rule 3) it is provided that equity cases shall be
tried without a jury unless the court or a judge shall otherwise
order.
"The twofold system of jurisdiction at law and in equity was
put an end to by the Judicature Act, 1873. The general scope
of the act was to enable a suitor to obtain by one proceeding in
one court the same ultimate result as he would previously have
obtained either by having selected the right court, as to which
there was frequently a difficulty, or after-as was sometimes
necessaryr-having been in two courts in succession.23 "It is not
provided by the act that legal and equitable rights 'shall be
treated as identical; and the same distinction exists between
legal and equitable estates as before the act." 24
A. L. SANBORN.
MADISON, WISC.
'Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 13, p. 6I.
"Ibid., 64.
